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Abstract
We study the control complexity of fallback voting. Like manipulation and bribery, electoral
control describes ways of changing the outcome of an election; unlike manipulation or bribery
attempts, control actions—such as adding/deleting/partitioning either candidates or voters—
modify the participative structure of an election. Via such actions one can try to either make
a favorite candidate win (“constructive control”) or prevent a despised candidate from winning
(“destructive control”). Computational complexity can be used to protect elections from control
attempts, i.e., proving an election system resistant to some type of control shows that the success
of the corresponding control action, though not impossible, is computationally prohibitive.
We show that fallback voting, an election system combining approval with majority voting
[BS09], is resistant to each of the common types of candidate control and to each common
type of constructive control. Among natural election systems with a polynomial-time winner
problem, only plurality and sincere-strategy preference-based approval voting (SP-AV) were
previously known to be fully resistant to candidate control [BTT92, HHR07, ENR09], and only
Copeland voting and SP-AV were previously known to be fully resistant to constructive control
[FHHR09a, ENR09]. However, plurality has fewer resistances to voter control, Copeland voting
has fewer resistances to destructive control, and SP-AV (which like fallback voting has 19 out
of 22 proven control resistances) is arguably less natural a system than fallback voting.
1 Introduction
Voting is a way of aggregating individual preferences (or votes) to achieve a societal consensus on
which among several alternatives (or candidates) to choose. This is a central method of decision-
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posium (CATS-2010) [ER10]. Supported in part by the DFG under grants RO 1202/12-1 (within the European Science
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making not only in human societies but also in, e.g., multiagent systems where autonomous software
agents may have differing individual preferences on a given number of alternatives. Voting has
been studied intensely in areas as diverse as social choice theory and political science, economics,
operations research, artificial intelligence, and other fields of computer science. Voting applications
in computer science include the web-page ranking problem [DKNS01], similarity search [FKS03],
planning [ER93], and recommender systems [GMHS99]. For such applications, it is important to
understand the computational properties of election systems.
Various ways of tampering with the outcome of elections have been studied from a complexity-
theoretic perspective, in particular the complexity of changing an election’s outcome by manipu-
lation [BTT89, BO91, CSL07, HH07, FHHR09c], control [BTT92, HHR07, FHHR09a, HHR09,
ENR09, FHHR09c], and bribery [FHH09, FHHR09a], see also the surveys by Faliszewski et
al. [FHHR09b] and Baumeister et al. [BEH+09].
In control scenarios, an external actor—commonly referred to as the “chair”—seeks to either
make a favorite candidate win (constructive control) or block a despised candidate’s victory (de-
structive control) via actions that change the participative structure of the election. Such actions
include adding, deleting, and partitioning either candidates or voters; the 22 commonly studied
control actions, and their corresponding control problems, are described formally in Section 2.
We study the control complexity of fallback voting, an election system introduced by Brams
and Sanver [BS09] as a way of combining approval and preference-based voting. We prove that
fallback voting is resistant (i.e., the corresponding control problem is NP-hard) to each of the 14
common types of candidate control. In addition, we show that fallback voting is resistant to five
types of voter control. In particular, fallback voting is resistant to each of the 11 common types of
constructive control. Among natural election systems with a polynomial-time winner determina-
tion procedure, only plurality and sincere-strategy preference-based approval voting (SP-AV) were
previously known to be fully resistant to candidate control [BTT92, HHR07, ENR09], and only
Copeland voting and SP-AV were previously known to be fully resistant to constructive control
[FHHR09a, ENR09]. However, SP-AV (as modified by [ENR09]) is arguably less natural a system
than fallback voting,1 and plurality has fewer resistances to voter control and Copeland voting has
fewer resistances to destructive control than fallback voting.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we recall some notions from voting theory,
define the commonly studied types of control, and explain Brams and Sanver’s fallback voting
procedure [BS06] in detail. Our results on the control complexity of fallback voting are presented
in Section 3. Finally, Section 4 provides some conclusions and open questions.
1SP-AV is (a variant of) another hybrid system combining approval and preference-based voting that was also pro-
posed by Brams and Sanver (see [BS06]). The reason we said SP-AV is less natural than fallback voting is that, in order to
preserve “admissibility” of votes (as required by Brams and Sanver [BS06] to preclude trivial approval strategies), SP-AV
(as modified by Erde´lyi et al. [ENR09]) employs an additional rule to (re-)coerce admissibility (in particular, if in the
course of a control action an originally admissible vote becomes inadmissible). This point has been discussed in detail by
Baumeister et al. [BEH+09]. In a nutshell, this rule, if applied, changes the approval strategies of the votes originally cast
by the voters. The effect of this rule is that SP-AV can be seen as a hybrid between approval and plurality voting, and it
indeed possesses each resistance either of these two systems has (and many of these resistance proofs are based on slightly
modified constructions from the resistance proofs for either plurality or approval due to Hemaspaandra et al. [HHR07]).
In contrast, here we study the original variant of fallback voting, as proposed by Brams and Sanver [BS09], in which
votes, once cast, do not change.
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2 Preliminaries
2.1 Elections and Electoral Control
An election is a pair (C,V ), where C is a finite set of candidates and V is a collection of votes
over C. How the votes are represented depends on the election system used. Many systems (such
as majority, Condorcet, and Copeland voting as well as the class of scoring protocols including
plurality, veto, and Borda voting; see, e.g., [BF02]) represent the voters’ preferences as strict, linear
orders over the candidates. In approval voting [BF78, BF83, Bra80], however, a vote over C is a so-
called approval strategy, a subset of C containing all candidates approved of by this voter, whereas
he or she disapproves of all other candidates. As is standard, we assume that collections V of votes
over C are given as lists of ballots, i.e., if, say, five voters express the same preference (be it as a
linear order or as an approval strategy or both) then this vote occurs five times in V .
An election system is a rule determining the winner(s) of a given election (C,V ). For example,
in plurality-rule elections, the winners are precisely those candidates in C who are ranked first place
by the most voters. In (simple) majority-rule elections, the winner is that candidate in C (assuming
one exists) who is ranked first place by a strict majority of the votes (i.e., by more than ‖V‖/2 voters).
In approval voting, every candidate scores one point for each approval by a voter, and whoever has
the most points wins.
All our control problems come in two variants: The constructive case [BTT92] focuses on the
chair seeking to make a favorite candidate win; the destructive case [HHR07] is concerned with
the chair seeking to make a despised candidate not win. Due to space, we describe these control
problems only very briefly. Detailed, formal problem descriptions, along with many motivating
examples and scenarios where these types of control naturally occur in real-world elections, can be
found, e.g., in [BTT92, HHR07, FHHR09a, HHR09, ENR09, BEH+09]. As an example, we state
one such problem formally:
Name: Constructive Control by Adding a Limited Number of Candidates.
Given: An election (C ∪D,V ), C ∩D = /0, a distinguished candidate c ∈ C, and a nonnegative
integer k. (C is the set of originally qualified candidates and D is the set of spoiler candidates
that may be added.)
Question: Does there exist a subset D′ ⊆ D such that ‖D′‖ ≤ k and c is the unique winner (under
the election system at hand) of election (C∪D′,V )?
Constructive Control by Adding an Unlimited Number of Candidates is the same except there is
no limit k on the number of spoiler candidates that may be added. The destructive variants of both
problems are obtained by asking whether c is not a unique winner of (C∪D′,V ). The constructive
control by deleting candidates problem is defined analogously except that we are given an election
(C,V ), a candidate c ∈C, and a deletion limit k, and ask whether c can be made a unique winner by
deleting up to k candidates from C. The destructive version of this problem is the same except that
we now want to preclude c from being a unique winner (and we are not allowed to delete c).
Constructive Control by Partition (or Run-Off Partition) of Candidates takes as input an elec-
tion (C,V ) and a candidate c ∈ C and asks whether c can be made a unique winner in a certain
two-stage election consisting of one (or two) first-round subelection(s) and a final round. In both
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variants, following [HHR07], we consider two tie-handling rules, TP (“ties promote”) and TE (“ties
eliminate”), that enter into force when more candidates than one are tied for winner in any of the
first-round subelections. In the variant with run-off and under the TP rule, the question is whether C
can be partitioned into C1 and C2 such that c is the unique winner of election (W1∪W2,V ), where Wi,
i ∈ {1,2}, is the set of winners of subelection (Ci,V ). In the variant without run-off (again under
TP), the question is whether C can be partitioned into C1 and C2 such that c is the unique winner
of election (W1 ∪C2,V ). In both cases, when the TE rule is used, none of multiple, tied first-round
subelection winners is promoted to the final round (e.g., if we have a run-off and ‖W2‖ ≥ 2 then the
final-round election collapses to (W1,V ); only a unique first-round subelection winner is promoted
to the final round). It is obvious how to obtain the destructive variants of these eight problems for-
malizing control by candidate partition. Summing up, we now have defined 14 candidate control
problems.
Constructive Control by Adding Voters is the problem of deciding, given an election (C,V ∪V ′),
V ∩V ′ = /0, where V is a collection of registered voters and V ′ a pool of as yet unregistered voters
that can be added, a candidate c ∈ C, and an addition limit k, whether there is a subset V ′′ ⊆ V ′
of size at most k such that c is the unique winner of election (C,V ∪V ′′). Constructive Control by
Deleting Voters asks, given an election (C,V ), a candidate c ∈ C, and a deletion limit k, whether
it is possible to make c the unique winner by deleting up to k votes from V . For the TP rule, in
Constructive Control by Partition of Voters the question is, given an election (C,V ) and a candidate
c ∈ C, whether V can be partitioned into V1 and V2 such that c is the unique winner of election
(W1∪W2,V ), where Wi, i ∈ {1,2}, is the set of winners of subelection (C,Vi). It is obvious how this
problem definition changes when the TE rule is used, and also how the destructive variants of these
four voter control problems are obtained. Summing up, we now have defined eight voter control
problems and thus a total of 22 control problems. These problems are due to [BTT92] and [HHR07]
(see also [FHHR09a]), and their complexity has been studied for a variety of election systems, with
the goal of using complexity as a barrier that makes attempts of changing the outcome of an election
via control, although not impossible, at least computationally prohibitive.
We assume the reader is familiar with the standard complexity classes P (deterministic poly-
nomial time) and NP (nondeterministic polynomial time) and with the notions of hardness and
completeness. In particular, a problem B is said to be NP-hard if for each A ∈ NP it holds that A
(polynomial-time many-one) reduces to B, where we say A reduces to B if there is a polynomial-
time function ϕ such that for each input x, x is in A if and only if ϕ(x) is in B. Every NP-hard
problem in NP is said to be NP-complete. For more background on complexity theory, we refer to
the textbooks [GJ79, Pap94, Rot05].
Given a control type Φ, some election systems have the advantageous property that it is never
possible for the chair to reach his or her goal of exerting control of type Φ. In such a case, the
system is said to be immune to Φ; otherwise, the system is said to be susceptible to Φ. We say an
election system E is resistant to Φ if E is susceptible to Φ and the control problem corresponding
to Φ is NP-hard. If, however, E is susceptible to Φ and the control problem corresponding to Φ is
in P, we say E is vulnerable to Φ.
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2.2 Fallback Voting
Brams and Sanver proposed two hybrid systems that combine approval voting and systems based
on linear preferences, sincere-strategy preference-based approval voting [BS06] and fallback voting
(FV) [BS09]. Erde´lyi et al. [ENR09] studied the control complexity of SP-AV, as they dubbed their
variant of the election system originally proposed by [BS06]. As explained in the last paragraph
of the introduction, SP-AV combines, in a certain sense, approval with plurality voting. In this
paper, we investigate the election system FV with respect to electoral control. FV can be thought
of as combining, in a certain sense, approval with majority voting. Unlike in SP-AV, in FV only the
approved candidates are ranked by a tie-free linear order.
Definition 2.1 ([BS09]). Let (C,V ) be an election. Every voter v ∈ V provides a subset Sv ⊆ C
indicating that v approves of all candidates in Sv and disapproves of all candidates in C−Sv. Sv is
called v’s approval strategy. In addition, each voter v ∈V provides a tie-free linear ordering of all
candidates in Sv.
If Sv = {c1,c2, . . . ,ck} and v ranks the candidates in Sv by c1 > c2 > · · · > ck, where c1 is v’s
most preferred candidate, c2 is v’s second most preferred candidate, etc., and ck is v’s least preferred
candidate (among the candidates v approves of), we denote the vote v by
c1 c2 · · · ck | C−Sv,
where the approved candidates to the left of the approval line are ranked and the disapproved
candidates in C− Sv are written as an (unordered) set to the right of the approval line. For each
c ∈C, let
score(C,V )(c) = ‖{v ∈V | c ∈ Sv}‖
denote the number of c’s approvals in (C,V ), and let scorei(C,V )(c) be the level i score of c in (C,V ),
which is the number of c’s approvals when ranked between the (inclusively) first and ith position.
Winner determination in FV is based on determining level i FV winners as follows:
1. On the first level, only the highest ranked approved candidates are considered in each voters’
approval strategy. If a candidate c ∈C has a strict majority on this level (i.e., score1(C,V )(c)>
‖V‖/2), then c is the (unique) level 1 FV winner of the election.
2. On the second level, if there is no level 1 winner, the two highest ranked approved candidates
(if they exist) are considered in each voters’ approval strategy. If there is exactly one can-
didate c ∈C who has a strict majority on this level (i.e., score2(C,V )(c) > ‖V‖/2), then c is the
(unique) level 2 FV winner of the election. If there are at least two such candidates, then
every candidate with the highest level 2 score is a level 2 FV winner of the election.
3. If there is no level 1 or level 2 FV winner, we in this way continue level by level until there is
at least one candidate who was approved by a strict majority on the current level, say level i.
If there is only one such candidate, he or she is the (unique) level i FV winner of the election.
If there are at least two such candidates, then every candidate with the highest level i score is
a level i FV winner of the election.
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FV SP-AV AV
Control by Const. Dest. Const. Dest. Const. Dest.
Adding an Unlimited Number of Candidates R R R R I V
Adding a Limited Number of Candidates R R R R I V
Deleting Candidates R R R R V I
Partition of Candidates TE: R TE: R TE: R TE: R TE: V TE: I
TP: R TP: R TP: R TP: R TP: I TP: I
Run-off Partition of Candidates TE: R TE: R TE: R TE: R TE: V TE: I
TP: R TP: R TP: R TP: R TP: I TP: I
Adding Voters R V R V R V
Deleting Voters R V R V R V
Partition of Voters TE: R TE: S TE: R TE: V TE: R TE: V
TP: R TP: R TP: R TP: R TP: R TP: V
Table 1: Overview of results. Key: I means immune, S means susceptible, R means resistant, V
means vulnerable, TE means ties eliminate, and TP means ties promote. Results new to this paper
are in boldface. Results for approval voting are due to [HHR07] and results for SP-AV are due to
[ENR09].
4. For each c ∈C, if c is a level i FV winner of (C,V ) for some (smallest) i ≤ ‖C‖ then c is said
to be an FV winner of (C,V ). Otherwise (i.e., if for no i ≤ ‖C‖ there is a level i FV winner),
every candidate with the highest score(C,V )(c) is an FV winner of (C,V ).
Note that if there exists a level 1 FV winner, he or she is always the election’s unique FV winner.
In contrast to SP-AV (where admissibility of the votes—/0 6= Sv 6=C for each v ∈V —is coerced by
moving the approval line whenever necessary, see [ENR09]), in fallback voting no changes are made
to the ballots, regardless of the control action taken. That is, we don’t require votes to be admissible,
i.e., both empty (Sv = /0) and full (Sv = C) approval strategies are allowed. By definition, votes in
an FV election are always sincere (i.e., if a voter v approves of a candidate c then the voter also
approves of all candidates ranked higher than c). In contrast, sincerity has to be enforced in SP-AV
by declaring insincere votes void.
3 Results
3.1 Overview
Theorem 3.1 and Table 1 show the results on the control complexity of fallback voting.
Theorem 3.1. Fallback voting is resistant, vulnerable, and susceptible to the 22 types of control
defined in Section 2 as shown in Table 1.
3.2 Susceptibility
Among the 22 control types we consider, approval voting has nine immunities [HHR07], see Ta-
ble 1. Some of these immunities immediately follow from the unique version of the Weak Axiom
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of Revealed Preference (Unique-WARP, for short), which says that if a candidate c is the unique
winner of an election (C,V ) then c is also the unique winner of each election (C′,V ) such that
C′ ⊂ C and c ∈ C′ (where, for convenience, we use the same symbol V but view the preferences
in V as being restricted to the candidates in C′; this convention is also adopted when we speak of
subelections in the context of candidate-control problems).
Unlike approval voting but just as SP-AV, fallback voting does not satisfy Unique-WARP.
Proposition 3.2. Fallback voting does not satisfy Unique-WARP.
Proof. Consider the election (C,V ) with candidate set C = {a,b,c,d} and voter collection V =
{v1,v2, . . . ,v6}:
(C,V )
v1 = v2 = v3 : a c | {b,d}
v4 = v5 : b d c | {a}
v6 : d a c | {b}
There is no level 1 FV winner, and the unique level 2 FV winner of the election (C,V ) is can-
didate a with score2(C,V )(a) = 4. By removing candidate b from the election, we get the subelection
(C′,V ) with C′ = {a,c,d}. (Recall that, after removing b, V is viewed as restricted to C′; e.g., voter
v4 in V is now changed to d c | {a} .) There is again no level 1 FV winner in (C′,V ). However,
there are two candidates on the second level with a strict majority, namely candidates a and c. Since
score2(C′,V )(c) = 5 is greater than score
2
(C′,V )(a) = 4, the unique level 2 FV winner of the subelection
(C′,V ) is candidate c. Thus, FV does not satisfy Unique-WARP. ❑
Indeed, as we will now show, fallback voting is susceptible to each of our 22 control types. Our
proofs make use of the results of [HHR07] that provide general proofs of and links between certain
susceptibility cases. For the sake of self-containment, we state their results, as Theorems A.1, A.2,
and A.3, in the appendix.
We start with susceptibility to candidate control.
Lemma 3.3. Fallback voting is susceptible to constructive and destructive control by adding can-
didates (in both the “limited” and the “unlimited” case), by deleting candidates, and by partition
of candidates (with or without run-off and for each in both model TE and model TP).
Proof. From Theorem A.1 and the fact that FV is a voiced voting system,2 it follows that FV
is susceptible to constructive control by deleting candidates, and to destructive control by adding
candidates (in both the “limited” and the “unlimited” case).
Now, consider the election (C,V ) given in the proof of Proposition 3.2. The unique FV winner
of the election is candidate a. Partition C into C1 = {a,c,d} and C2 = {b}. The unique FV winner
of subelection (C1,V ) is candidate c, as shown in the proof of Proposition 3.2. In both partition and
run-off partition of candidates and for each in both tie-handling models, TE and TP, candidate b runs
against candidate c in the final stage of the election. The unique FV winner is in each case candidate
2An election system is said to be voiced if the single candidate in any one-candidate election always wins.
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c. Thus, FV is susceptible to destructive control by partition of candidates (with or without run-off
and for each in both model TE and model TP).
By Theorem A.3, FV is also susceptible to destructive control by deleting candidates. By The-
orem A.2, FV is also susceptible to constructive control by adding candidates (in both the “limited”
and the “unlimited” case).
Now, changing the roles of a and c makes c our distinguished candidate. In election (C,V ), c
loses against candidate a. By partitioning the candidates as described above, c becomes the unique
FV winner of the election. Thus, FV is susceptible to constructive control by partition of candidates
(with or without run-off and for each in both tie-handling models, TE and TP). ❑
We now turn to susceptibility to voter control.
Lemma 3.4. Fallback voting is susceptible to constructive and destructive control by adding voters,
by deleting voters, and by partition of voters (in both model TE and model TP).
Proof. Consider the election (C,V ), where C = {a,b,c,d} is the set of candidates and V =
{v1,v2,v3,v4} is the collection of voters with the following preferences:
(C,V )
v1 : a c | {b,d}
v2 : d c | {a,b}
v3 : b a c | {d}
v4 : b a | {c,d}
We partition V into V1 = {v1,v2} and V2 = {v3,v4}. Thus we split (C,V ) into two subelections:
(C,V1) and (C,V2)
v1 : a c | {b,d}
v2 : d c | {a,b}
v3 : b a c | {d}
v4 : b a | {c,d}
Clearly, candidate a is the unique level 2 FV winner of (C,V ). However, c is the unique level 2
FV winner of (C,V1) and b is the unique level 1 FV winner of (C,V2), and so a is not promoted to the
final stage. Thus, FV is susceptible to destructive control by partition of voters in both tie-handling
models, TE and TP.
By Theorem A.1 and the fact that FV is a voiced voting system, FV is susceptible to destructive
control by deleting voters. By Theorem A.2, FV is also susceptible to constructive control by adding
voters.
By changing the roles of a and c again, we can see that FV is susceptible to constructive control
by partition of voters in both model TE and model TP. By Theorem A.3, FV is also susceptible
to constructive control by deleting voters. Finally, again by Theorem A.2, FV is susceptible to
destructive control by adding voters. ❑
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3.3 Candidate Control
All resistance results in this section follow via Lemma 3.3, showing susceptibility, and a reduc-
tion from the well-known NP-complete problem Hitting Set [GJ79], showing NP-hardness of the
corresponding control problem. Hitting Set is defined as follows:
Name: Hitting Set.
Instance: A set B= {b1,b2, . . . ,bm}, a collection S = {S1,S2, . . . ,Sn} of nonempty subsets Si ⊆ B,
and a positive integer k ≤ m.
Question: Does S have a hitting set of size at most k, i.e., is there a set B′ ⊆ B with ‖B′‖ ≤ k such
that for each i, Si ∩B′ 6= /0?
We now show that fallback voting is resistant to all types of constructive and destructive candi-
date control defined in Section 2. To this end, we present a general construction that will be applied
(in Theorems 3.7, 3.8, and 3.9 below) to all these control scenarios except constructive control by
deleting candidates (which will be handled via a different construction in Theorem 3.10).
Construction 3.5. Let (B,S ,k) be a given instance of Hitting Set, where B = {b1,b2, . . . ,bm} is
a set, S = {S1,S2, . . . ,Sn} is a collection of nonempty subsets Si ⊆ B, and k is a positive integer.
Without loss of generality, we may assume that n > 1 (since Hitting Set is trivially solvable for
n ≤ 1) and that k < m (since B is always a hitting set of size k if m = k when S contains only
nonempty sets).
Define the election (C,V ), where C = B∪{c,d,w} is the candidate set and where V consists of
the following 6n(k+1)+4m+11 voters:
1. There are 2m+1 voters of the form:
c | B∪{d,w}.
2. There are 2n+2k(n−1)+3 voters of the form:
c w | B∪{d}.
3. There are 2n(k+1)+5 voters of the form:
w c | B∪{d}.
4. For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, there are 2(k+1) voters of the form:3
d Si c | (B−Si)∪{w}.
3As a notation, when a vote contains a set of approved candidates, such as c D a | C− (D∪{a,c}) for a subset
D⊆C of the candidates, this is a shorthand for c d1 · · · dℓ a | C− (D∪{a,c}) , where the elements of D= {d1, . . . ,dℓ}
are ranked with respect to a (tacitly assumed) fixed ordering of all candidates in C.
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5. For each j, 1 ≤ j ≤ m, there are two voters of the form:
d b j w | (B−{b j})∪{c}.
6. There are 2(k+1) voters of the form:
d w c | B.
It is easy to see that there is no level 1 FV winner in election ({c,d,w},V ) and that we have the
following level 2 scores in this election:
score2({c,d,w},V )(c) = 2(m− k)+6n(k+1)+9,
score2({c,d,w},V )(d) = 2n(k+1)+2(m+ k+1), and
score2({c,d,w},V )(w) = 4n(k+1)+2m+10.
Thus, c is the unique level 2 FV winner of ({c,d,w},V ).
The proofs of Theorems 3.7, 3.8, and 3.9 below will make use of the following lemma.
Lemma 3.6. Consider the election (C,V ) constructed according to Construction 3.5 from a
Hitting Set instance (B,S ,k).
1. If S has a hitting set B′ of size k, then w is the unique FV winner of election (B′∪{c,d,w},V ).
2. Let D ⊆ B∪{d,w}. If c is not a unique FV winner of election (D∪{c},V ), then there exists
a set B′ ⊆ B such that
(a) D = B′∪{d,w},
(b) w is the unique level 2 FV winner of election (B′∪{c,d,w},V ), and
(c) B′ is a hitting set for S of size at most k.
Proof. For the first part, suppose that B′ is a hitting set for S of size k. Then there is no level 1
FV winner in election (B′∪{c,d,w},V ), and we have the following level 2 scores:
score2(B′∪{c,d,w},V )(c) = 4n(k+1)+2(m− k)+9,
score2(B′∪{c,d,w},V )(d) = 2n(k+1)+2(m+ k+1),
score2(B′∪{c,d,w},V )(w) = 4n(k+1)+2(m− k)+10,
score2(B′∪{c,d,w},V )(b j) ≤ 2n(k+1)+2 for all b j ∈ B′.
It follows that w is the unique level 2 FV winner of election (B′∪{c,d,w},V ).
For the second part, let D ⊆ B∪ {d,w}. Suppose c is not a unique FV winner of election
(D∪{c},V ).
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(2a) Other than c, only w is approved by a strict majority of voters and only w can tie or beat c by
the number of approvals in (D∪{c},V ). Thus, since c is not a unique FV winner of election
(D∪{c},V ), w is clearly in D. In (D∪{c},V ), candidate w has no level 1 strict majority, and
candidate c has already on level 2 a strict majority. Thus, w must tie or beat c on level 2. For
a contradiction, suppose d /∈ D. Then
score2(D∪{c},V )(c)≥ 4n(k+1)+2m+11.
The overall score of w is
score(D∪{c},V )(w) = 4n(k+1)+2m+10,
which contradicts our assumption, that w ties or beats c on level 2. Thus, D = B′ ∪{d,w},
where B′ ⊆ B.
(2b) This part follows immediately from part (2a).
(2c) Let ℓ be the number of sets in S not hit by B′. We have that
score2(B′∪{c,d,w},V )(w) = 4n(k+1)+10+2(m−‖B
′‖),
score2(B′∪{c,d,w},V )(c) = 2(m− k)+4n(k+1)+9+2(k+1)ℓ.
From part (2a) we know that
score2(B′∪{c,d,w},V )(w)≥ score
2
(B′∪{c,d,w},V )(c),
so
4n(k+1)+10+2(m−‖B′‖) ≥ 2(m− k)+4n(k+1)+9+2(k+1)ℓ.
The above inequality implies
1 > 1
2
≥ ‖B′‖− k+(k+1)ℓ≥ 0,
so ‖B′‖− k+(k+1)ℓ = 0. Thus ℓ= 0, and it follows that B′ is a hitting set for S of size at
most k.
This completes the proof of Lemma 3.6. ❑
Theorem 3.7. Fallback voting is resistant to constructive and destructive control by adding candi-
dates (both in the limited and the unlimited version of the problem).
Proof. Susceptibility holds by Lemma 3.3. NP-hardness follows immediately from Lemma 3.6,
via mapping the Hitting Set instance (B,S ,k) to the instance
1. (({c,d,w}∪B,V ),w,k) of Constructive Control by Adding a Limited Number of Candidates,
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2. (({c,d,w}∪B,V ),c,k) of Destructive Control by Adding a Limited Number of Candidates,
3. (({c,d,w} ∪B,V ),w) of Constructive Control by Adding an Unlimited Number of Candi-
dates, and
4. (({c,d,w}∪B,V ),c) of Destructive Control by Adding an Unlimited Number of Candidates.
where in each case c, d, and w are the qualified candidates and B is the set of spoiler candidates. ❑
Theorem 3.8. Fallback voting is resistant to destructive control by deleting candidates.
Proof. Susceptibility holds by Lemma 3.3. To show the problem NP-hard, let (C,V ) be the
election resulting from a Hitting Set instance (B,S ,k) according to Construction 3.5, and let c be
the distinguished candidate.
We claim that S has a hitting set of size at most k if and only if c can be prevented from being
a unique FV winner by deleting at most m− k candidates.
From left to right: Suppose S has a hitting set B′ of size k. Delete the m− k candidates B−B′.
Now, both candidates c and w have a strict majority on level 2, but
score2({c,d,w}∪B′ ,V )(c) = 4n(k+1)+2(m− k)+9,
score2({c,d,w}∪B′ ,V )(w) = 4n(k+1)+2(m− k)+10,
so w is the unique level 2 FV winner of this election.
From right to left: Suppose that c can be prevented from being a unique FV winner by deleting
at most m− k candidates. Let D′ ⊆ B∪ {d,w} be the set of deleted candidates (so c /∈ D′) and
D = (C−D′)−{c}. It follows immediately from Lemma 3.6 that D = B′∪{d,w}, where B′ is a
hitting set for S of size at most k. ❑
Theorem 3.9. Fallback voting is resistant to constructive and destructive control by partition of
candidates and by run-off partition of candidates (for each in both tie-handling models, TE and TP).
Proof. Susceptibility holds by Lemma 3.3, so it remains to show NP-hardness. For the construc-
tive cases, map the given Hitting Set instance (B,S ,k) to the election (C,V ) from Construction 3.5
with distinguished candidate w.
We claim that S has a hitting set of size at most k if and only if w can be made a unique FV
winner by exerting control via any of our four control scenarios (partition of candidates with or
without run-off, and for each in either tie-handling model, TE and TP).
From left to right: Suppose S has a hitting set B′ ⊆ B of size k. Partition the set of candidates
into the two subsets C1 = B′∪{c,d,w} and C2 =C−C1. According to Lemma 3.6, w is the unique
level 2 FV winner of subelection (C1,V ) = (B′∪{c,d,w},V ). Note that w’s score in the final stage
is at least 2(m−k)+4n(k+1)+9. Since (no matter whether we have a run-off or not, and regardless
of the tie-handling rule used) the opponents of w in the final stage (if there are any opponents at all)
each are candidates from B whose score is at most 2n(k+1)+2, w is the only candidate in the final
stage with a strict majority of approvals. Thus, w is the unique FV winner of the resulting election.
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From right to left: Suppose w can be made a unique FV winner via any of our four control
scenarios. Since c is not an FV winner of the election, there is a subset D⊆ B∪{d,w} of candidates
such that c is not a unique FV winner of the election (D∪{c},V ). By Lemma 3.6, there exists a
hitting set for S of size at most k.
For the four destructive cases, we simply change the roles of c and w in the above argument. ❑
Construction 3.5 does not work for constructive control by deleting candidates in fallback vot-
ing. By deleting c the chair could make w a unique FV winner, regardless of whether or not S has
a hitting set of size k. The following theorem provides a different construction that shows resistance
in this case as well.
Theorem 3.10. Fallback voting is resistant to constructive control by deleting candidates.
Proof. Susceptibility holds by Lemma 3.3. To show NP-hardness, let (B,S ,k) be a Hitting Set
instance with B = {b1,b2, . . . ,bm} a set, S = {S1,S2, . . . ,Sn} a collection of nonempty subsets
Si ⊆ B, and k ≤ m a positive integer. Define the election (C,V ) with candidate set
C = B∪C′∪D∪E∪{w},
where C′ = {c1,c2, . . . ,ck+1}, D = {d1,d2, . . . ,ds}, E = {e1,e2, . . . ,en}, w is the distinguished
candidate, and the number of candidates in D is s = ∑ni=1 si with si = n + k − ‖Si‖, so s =
n2 + kn−∑ni=1 ‖Si‖. Define V to be the following collection of 2(n+ k+1)+1 voters:
1. For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, there is one voter of the form:
Si Di w | (B−Si)∪ (D−Di)∪C′∪E,
where Di = {d1+∑i−1j=1 s j , . . . ,d∑ij=1 s j}.
2. For each j, 1 ≤ j ≤ k+1, there is one voter of the form:
E (C′−{c j}) c j | B∪D∪{w}.
3. There are k+1 voters of the form:
w | B∪C′∪D∪E.
4. There are n voters of the form:
C′ | B∪D∪E∪{w}.
5. There is one voter of the form:
C′ w | B∪D∪E.
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Note that there is no unique FV winner in the above election; the candidates in C′ and w are all
level n+ k+1 FV winners.
We claim that S has a hitting set of size k if and only if w can be made a unique FV winner by
deleting at most k candidates.
From left to right: Suppose S has a hitting set B′ of size k. Delete the corresponding candidates.
Now, w is the unique level (n+ k) FV winner of the resulting election.
From right to left: Suppose w can be made a unique FV winner by deleting at most k candidates.
Since k+1 candidates other than w have a strict majority on level n+ k+1 in election (C,V ), after
deleting at most k candidates, there is still at least one candidate other than w with a strict majority
of approvals on level n+ k+ 1. However, since w was made a unique FV winner by deleting at
most k candidates, w must be the unique FV winner on a level lower than or equal to n+ k. This is
possible only if in all n votes of the first voter group w moves forward by at least one position. This,
however, is possible only if S has a hitting set B′ of size k. ❑
3.4 Voter Control
All vulnerability results in this section follow via Lemma 3.4, showing susceptibility, and a
polynomial-time algorithm for the corresponding control problem. All resistance results in this
section follow via Lemma 3.4, showing susceptibility, and a reduction from either Hitting Set or the
well-known NP-complete problem Exact Cover by Three-Sets [GJ79], which is defined as follows:
Name: Exact Cover by Three-Sets (X3C).
Instance: A set B = {b1,b2, . . . ,b3m}, m ≥ 1, and a collection S = {S1,S2, . . . ,Sn} of subsets
Si ⊆ B with ‖Si‖= 3 for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Question: Is there a subcollection S ′ ⊆ S such that each element of B occurs in exactly one set
in S ′?
Our first result for voter control says that fallback voting is resistant to constructive control by
adding voters and to constructive control by deleting voters.
Theorem 3.11. Fallback voting is resistant to constructive control by adding voters and by deleting
voters.
Proof. Susceptibility holds by Lemma 3.4 in both cases. We first prove NP-hardness—and thus
resistance—of Constructive Control by Adding Voters. Let (B,S ) be an X3C instance, where
B = {b1,b2, . . . ,b3m} is a set with m > 1 and S = {S1,S2, . . . ,Sn} is a collection of subsets Si ⊆ B
with ‖Si‖= 3 for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. (Note that X3C is trivial to solve for m = 1.)
Define the election (C,V ∪V ′), where C = B∪{w}∪D with D = {d1, . . . ,dn(3m−4)} is the set
of candidates, w is the distinguished candidate, and V ∪V ′ is the following collection of n+m− 2
voters:4
4This construction—just as that for SP-AV [ENR09]—is based on the corresponding construction for approval voting
[HHR07].
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1. V is the collection of m−2 registered voters of the form:
B | D∪{w}.
2. V ′ is the collection of unregistered voters, where for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, there is one voter of
the form:
Di Si w | (B−Si)∪ (D−Di),
where Di = {d(i−1)(3m−4)+1, . . . ,di(3m−4)}.
Since w has no approvals in (C,V ), w is not a unique FV winner in (C,V ).
We claim that S has an exact cover for B if and only if w can be made a unique FV winner by
adding at most m voters from V ′.
From left to right: Suppose S contains an exact cover for B. Let V ′′ contain the corresponding
voters from V ′ (i.e., voters of the form Di Si w | (B−Si)∪ (D−Di) for each Si in the exact cover)
and add V ′′ to the election. It follows that score(C,V∪V ′′)(d j) = 1 for all d j ∈ D, score(C,V∪V ′′)(b j) =
m−1 for all b j ∈ B, and score(C,V∪V ′′)(w) = m. Thus, only w has a strict majority of approvals and
so is the unique FV winner of the election.
From right to left: Let V ′′ ⊆ V ′ be such that ‖V ′′‖ ≤ m and w is the unique winner of election
(C,V ∪V ′′). Since w must in particular beat every b j ∈ B, it follows that ‖V ′′‖= m and each b j ∈ B
can gain only one additional point. Thus, the m voters in V ′′ correspond to an exact cover for B.
Next, we show that FV is resistant to constructive control by deleting voters. Let (B,S ) be an
X3C instance as above. Define the election (C,V ), where C = B∪{c,w}∪D is the set of candidates
with D = {d1,d2, . . . ,d3nm}, w is the distinguished candidate, and V is the following collection of
2n+m−1 voters:
1. For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, there is one voter of the form:
Si c | (B−Si)∪D∪{w}.
2. For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, there is one voter of the form:
Bi Di w | (B−Bi)∪{c}∪ (D−Di),
where, letting ℓ j = ‖{Si ∈S |b j ∈ Si}‖ for each j, 1≤ j ≤ 3m, Bi = {b j ∈ B | i ≤ n− ℓ j} and
Di = {d(i−1)3m+1, . . . ,d3im−‖Bi‖}.
Note that Di = /0 if ‖Bi‖= 3m. Note also that w is always ranked on the (3m+1)st place.
3. There are m−1 voters of the form:
c | B∪D∪{w}.
Note that score(w) = score(bi) = n for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ 3m, score(d j) = 1 or score(d j) = 0 for all
d j ∈D, and score(c) = n+m−1, and since only c has a strict majority (which is reached on level 4),
c is the unique level 4 FV winner of the election.
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We claim that S has an exact cover for B if and only if w can be made a unique FV winner by
deleting at most m voters.
From left to right: Suppose S contains an exact cover for B. By deleting the corresponding
voters from the first voter group, we have the following scores: score(w)= n, score(bi)= score(c)=
n− 1 for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ 3m, and score(d j) = 1 or score(d j) = 0 for all d j ∈ D. Since there are now
2n−1 voters in the election, only candidate w has a strict majority, so w is the unique FV winner of
the election.
From right to left: Suppose w can be made a unique FV winner by deleting at most m voters.
Since w’s approvals are all on the (3m+ 1)st position, neither c nor any of the bi can have a strict
majority on any of the previous levels. In particular, candidate c must have lost exactly m points
after deletion, and this is possible only if the m deleted voters are all from the first or third voter
group. On the other hand, each bi ∈ B must have lost at least one point after deletion, and this is
possible only if exactly m voters were deleted from the first voter group. These m voters correspond
to an exact cover for B. ❑
In contrast to the constructive voter-control cases of Theorem 3.11, fallback voting is vulnerable
to destructive control by adding voters and to destructive control by deleting voters. In fact, the
proof of Theorem 3.12 shows something slightly stronger: FV is what [HHR07] call “certifiably
vulnerable” to these two destructive voter-control cases, i.e., the algorithm we present in this proof
for destructive control by adding voters even computes a successful control action if one exists
(instead of only solving the corresponding decision problem).5
Theorem 3.12. Fallback voting is vulnerable to destructive control by adding voters and by deleting
voters.
Proof. Susceptibility holds by Lemma 3.4 in both cases. We present a polynomial-time algorithm
for solving the destructive control by adding voters case. We will make use of the following notation.
Given an election (C,V ), let maj(V ) = ⌊‖V‖/2⌋+ 1 and define the deficit of candidate d ∈ C for
reaching a strict majority in (C,V ) on level i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ‖C‖, by
def i(C,V )(d) = maj(V )− scorei(C,V )(d).
The input to our algorithm is an election (C,V ∪V ′) (where C is the set of candidates, V is
the collection of registered voters, and V ′ is the collection of unregistered voters), a distinguished
candidate c ∈C, and an integer ℓ (the number of voters allowed to be added). The algorithm either
outputs a subset V ′′ ⊆ V ′, ‖V ′′‖ ≤ ℓ, that describes a successful control action (if any exists), or
indicates that control is impossible for this input.
We give a high-level description of the algorithm. We assume that c is initially the unique FV
winner of election (C,V ); otherwise, the algorithm simply outputs V ′′ = /0 and halts, since there is
no need to add any voters from V ′.
Let n = maxv∈V∪V ′ ‖Sv‖. Clearly, n ≤ ‖C‖. The algorithm proceeds in at most n+ 1 stages,
where the last stage is the approval stage and checks whether c can be dethroned as a unique FV
5And the same holds for the algorithm showing that FV is vulnerable to destructive control by deleting voters, which
is not presented here due to space.
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winner by approval score via adding at most ℓ voters from V ′, and all preceding stages are majority
stages that check whether a candidate d 6= c can tie or beat c on level i via adding at most ℓ voters
from V ′. Since the first majority stage is slightly different from the subsequent majority stages, we
describe both cases separately.
Majority Stage 1: For each candidate d ∈C−{c}, check whether d can tie or beat c on the first
level via adding at most ℓ voters from V ′. To this end, first check whether
def 1(C,V )(d) ≤
ℓ
2
;(3.1)
score1(C,V )(d) ≥ score
1
(C,V )(c)− ℓ.(3.2)
If (3.1) or (3.2) fails to hold, this d is hopeless, so go to the next candidate (or to the next stage
if all other candidates have already been checked in this stage). If (3.1) and (3.2) hold, find a set
V ′d ⊆V ′ of largest cardinality such that ‖V ′d‖ ≤ ℓ and all voters in V ′d approve of d on the first level
but disapprove of c on the first level. Check whether
score1(C,V∪V ′d)
(d)≥ score1(C,V∪V ′d)(c).(3.3)
If (3.3) fails to hold, this d is hopeless, so go to the next candidate (or to the next stage if all other
candidates have already been checked in this stage). If (3.3) holds, check whether d has a strict
majority in (C,V ∪V ′d) on the first level, and if so, output V ′′ =V ′d and halt.
Majority Stage i, 1 < i ≤ n: This stage is entered only if it was not possible to find a successful
control action in majority stages 1, . . . , i−1. For each candidate d ∈C−{c}, check whether d can
tie or beat c up to the ith level via adding at most ℓ voters from V ′. To this end, first check whether
def i(C,V )(d) ≤
ℓ
2
;(3.4)
scorei(C,V )(d) ≥ score
i
(C,V )(c)− ℓ.(3.5)
If (3.4) or (3.5) fails to hold, this d is hopeless, so go to the next candidate (or to the next stage
if all other candidates have already been checked in this stage). If (3.4) and (3.5) hold, find a set
V ′d ⊆V ′ of largest cardinality such that ‖V ′d‖ ≤ ℓ and all voters in V ′d approve of d up to the ith level
but disapprove of c up to the ith level. Check whether
scorei(C,V∪V ′d)
(d)≥ scorei(C,V∪V ′d)(c)(3.6)
If (3.6) fails to hold, this d is hopeless, so go to the next candidate (or to the next stage if all other
candidates have already been checked in this stage). If (3.6) holds, check whether d has a strict
majority in (C,V ∪V ′d) on the ith level, and if so, check whether
scorei−1(C,V∪V ′d)
(c)≥ maj(V ∪V ′d).(3.7)
If (3.7) fails to hold, output V ′′ = V ′d and halt. Otherwise (i.e., if (3.7) holds), though d might be
able to dethrone c by adding V ′d on the ith level, this was not early enough, since c has already won
at a previous level. In that case, find a largest set V ′cd ⊆V ′ such that
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1. ‖V ′d ∪V ′cd‖ ≤ ℓ,
2. all voters in V ′cd approve of both c and d up to the ith level, and
3. the voters in V ′cd are chosen such that c is approved of as late as possible by them (i.e., at
levels with a largest possible number, where ties may be broken arbitrarily).
Now, check whether
scorei−1(C,V∪V ′d∪V ′cd)
(c)≥ maj(V ∪V ′d ∪V ′cd).(3.8)
If (3.8) holds, then this d is hopeless, so go to the next candidate (or to the next stage if all other
candidates have already been checked in this stage). Otherwise (i.e., if (3.8) fails to hold), check
whether ‖V ′cd‖ ≥ def i(C,V∪V ′d)(d). If so (i.e., d has now a strict majority on level i), output V
′′ =
V ′d ∪V ′cd and halt. Note that, by choice of V ′cd , (3.6) implies that
scorei(C,V∪V ′d∪V ′cd)
(d)≥ scorei(C,V∪V ′d∪V ′cd)(c).
Thus, in (C,V ∪V ′d ∪V ′cd), d ties or beats c and has a strict majority on the ith level (and now, we are
sure that d was not too late). Otherwise (i.e., if ‖V ′cd‖< def i(C,V∪V ′d)(d)), this d is hopeless, so go to
the next candidate (or stage).
Approval Stage: This stage is entered only if it was not possible to find a successful control action
in majority stages 1, . . . ,n. First, check if
score(C,V )(c)<
⌊
‖V‖+ ℓ
2
⌋
+1.(3.9)
If (3.9) fails to hold, output “control impossible” and halt, since we have found no candidate in
the majority stages who could tie or beat c and have a strict majority when adding at most ℓ voters
from V ′, so adding any choice of at most ℓ voters from V ′ would c still leave a strict majority.
If (3.9) holds, looping over all candidates d ∈ C −{c}, check whether there are score(C,V )(c)−
score(C,V )(d)≤ ℓ voters in V ′ who approve of d and disapprove of c. If this is not the case, move on
to the next candidate, since d could never catch up on c via adding at most ℓ voters from V ′. If it is
the case for some d ∈C−{c}, however, add this set of voters (call it V ′d) and check whether
score(C,V∪V ′d)(c)< maj(V ∪V
′
d).(3.10)
If (3.10) holds, output V ′′ =V ′d and halt. Otherwise (i.e., if (3.10) fails to hold), check whether
ℓ−‖V ′d‖ ≥ ‖V ′/0‖(3.11)
≥ 2
(
score(C,V∪V ′d)(c)−
‖V ∪V ′d‖
2
)
,
where V ′/0 is contained in the set of voters in V ′ who disapprove of both candidates c and d. If (3.11)
does not hold, move on to the next candidate, since after adding these voters c would still have a
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strict majority. Otherwise (i.e., if (3.11) holds), add exactly 2
(
score(C,V∪V ′d)(c)−
‖V∪V ′d‖/2
)
voters
from V ′/0 (denoted by V ′/0,+). Output V ′′ =V ′d ∪V ′/0,+ and halt.
If we have entered the approval stage (because we were not successful in any of the majority
stages), but couldn’t find any candidate here who was able to dethrone c by adding at most ℓ voters
from V ′, we output “control impossible” and halt.
The correctness of the algorithm follows from the remarks made above. Crucially, note that the
algorithm proceeds in the “safest way possible”: If there is any successful control action at all then
our algorithm finds some successful control action. It is also easy to see that this algorithm runs in
polynomial time. (Note that we didn’t optimize it in terms of running time; rather, we described it
in a way to make it easier to check its correctness.)
The deleting-voters case follows by a similar algorithm (and is omitted here due to space). ❑
Theorem 3.13. Fallback voting is resistant to constructive control by partition of voters in
model TE.
Proof. Susceptibility holds by Lemma 3.4. To prove NP-hardness, we reduce X3C to our control
problem. Let (B,S ) be an X3C instance with B = {b1,b2, . . . ,b3m}, m ≥ 1, and a collection S =
{S1,S2, . . . ,Sn} of subsets Si ⊆ B with ‖Si‖ = 3 for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Our construction, like the
corresponding one for SP-AV [ENR09], is based on the corresponding construction for approval
voting [HHR07]. Define the election (C,V ), where C = B∪{c,x,y,w}∪Z is the set of candidates,
Z = {z1,z2, . . . ,zn}, and w is the distinguished candidate. Define the value ℓ j = ‖{Si ∈S |b j ∈ Si}‖
for each j, 1 ≤ j ≤ 3m. Let V consist of the following 4n+2m−1 voters:
1. For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, there is one voter of the form:
c Si | (B−Si)∪{x,y,w}∪Z.
2. For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, there is one voter of the form:
(Z−{zi}) Bi w | (B−Bi) {c,x,y,zi},
where Bi = {b j ∈ B | i ≤ n− ℓ j}.
3. For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, there is one voter of the form:
c zi | B∪{x,y,w}∪ (Z−{zi}).
4. There are n+m voters of the form:
x | B∪{c,y,w}∪Z.
5. There are m−1 voters of the form:
y | B∪{c,x,w}∪Z.
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Note that for each i ∈ {1, . . . ,n} and for each j ∈ {1, . . . ,3m}, we have score(C,V )(b j) =
score(C,V )(zi) = score(C,V )(w) = n, score(C,V )(c) = 2n, score(C,V )(x) = n+m, and score(C,V )(y) =
m− 1. Thus, there is no candidate with a strict majority on any level in election (C,V ) and, in
particular, candidate w is not a unique FV winner.
We claim that S has an exact cover for B if and only if w can be made a unique FV winner of
the resulting election by partition of voters in model TE.
From left to right: Suppose S contains an exact cover S ′ for B. Partition V in the following
way. Let V1 consist of:
• the m voters of the first group that correspond to the exact cover (i.e., those m voters of the
form c Si | (B−Si)∪{x,y,w}∪Z for which Si ∈S ′),
• the n voters of the third group (who approve of c and zi), and
• the n+m voters of the fourth group (who approve of only x).
Let V2 = V −V1. In subelection (C,V1), no candidate has a strict majority on any level, and c and
x tie for first place on the first level, both with score n+m = ‖V1‖/2. Thus, there is no candidate
proceeding forward to the final round. In subelection (C,V2), only candidate w has a strict majority,
so w is the only participant in the final round of the election and thus has been made a unique FV
winner by this partition of voters.
From right to left: Suppose that w can be made a unique FV winner by exerting control by
partition of voters in model TE. We can argue for FV as [ENR09] do for SP-AV (see also [HHR07]):
Let (V1,V2) be such a successful partition. Since we are in model TE, w has to be the unique winner
of one of the subelections, say of (C,V1). Each voter of the form c zi | B∪{x,y,w}∪ (Z−{zi})
has to be in V2, for otherwise there would be a candidate zi ∈ Z with score(C,V1)(zi)= score(C,V1)(w)=
n, and zi would get his or her approvals on an earlier level than w. Thus, w would not be the
unique winner of subelection (C,V1). On the other hand, there can be only m voters of the form
c Si | (B−Si)∪{x,y,w}∪Z in V2, for otherwise c would have the highest score in subelection
(C,V2), namely score(C,V2)(c) > n+m, and c would reach this score already on level 1. Thus, c
would be the unique winner of subelection (C,V2), and would also beat w in the run-off because
none of the candidates c and w would have a strict majority in election ({c,w},V ), but c would beat
w by approval score. So there are at most m voters of the form c Si | (B−Si)∪{x,y,w}∪Z in V2.
However, there must be exactly m such voters in V2 and these m voters correspond to an exact cover
for B, since otherwise there would be a candidate b j ∈ B that has the same score in subelection
(C,V1) as w, namely n points, and b j would get his or her approvals on an earlier level than w,
contradicting the assumption that w is the unique FV winner of subelection (C,V1). ❑
Finally, we turn to control by partition of voters in model TP. We start with the constructive
case.
Theorem 3.14. Fallback voting is resistant to constructive control by partition of voters in
model TP.
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Proof. Susceptibility holds by Lemma 3.4. The proof of resistance is based on the construction
of [ENR09, Thm. 3.14]. Let (B,S ) be an X3C instance with B = {b1,b2, . . . ,b3m}, m ≥ 1, and
a collection S = {S1,S2, . . . ,Sn} of subsets Si ⊆ B with ‖Si‖ = 3 for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and let
n > m+1. Define the election (C,V ), where C = B∪F ∪Z∪{w,x,y} is the set of candidates, where
F = { f1, f2, . . . , fn+m+1}, Z = {z1,z2, . . . ,zn}, and w is the distinguished candidate. Define the value
ℓ j = ‖{Si ∈S |b j ∈ Si}‖ for each j, 1≤ j ≤ 3m. Let V consist of the following 6n+2m+2 voters:
1. For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, there is one voter of the form:
y Si | (B−Si)∪F ∪Z∪{w,x}.
2. For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, there is one voter of the form:
y zi | B∪F ∪ (Z−{zi})∪{w,x}.
3. For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, there is one voter of the form:
(Z−{zi}) Bi w | (B−Bi)∪F ∪{x,y,zi},
where Bi = {b j ∈ B | i ≤ n− ℓ j}.
4. There are n voters of the form:
Z B w | F ∪{x,y}.
5. There are n+m+1 voters of the form:
x | B∪F ∪Z∪{w,y}.
6. For each k, 1 ≤ k ≤ n+m+1, there is one voter of the form:
fk | B∪ (F−{ fk})∪Z∪{w,x,y}.
The overall scores of the candidates in election (C,V ) can be seen in Table 2.
w x y b j fk zi
score(C,V ) 2n n+m+1 2n 2n 1 2n
Table 2: Overall scores in (C,V ).
Since the strict majority threshold for V is 3n+m+2, there is no candidate with a strict majority
on any level in election (C,V ) and, in particular, since score(C,V )(y) = score(C,V )(w), candidate w is
not a unique FV winner.
We claim that S has an exact cover for B if and only if w can be made a unique FV winner via
exerting control by partition of voters in model TP.
From left to right: Suppose S contains an exact cover S ′ for B. Partition V in the following
way. Let V1 consist of:
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• the m voters of the first group that correspond to the exact cover (i.e., those m voters of the
form y Si | (B−Si)∪F ∪Z∪{w,x} for which Si ∈S ′),
• the n voters of the second group (who approve of y and zi for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n), and
• the n+m+1 voters of the fifth group (who approve of only x).
Let V2 =V −V1.
w x y b j fk zi
score(C,V1) 0 n+m+1 n+m 1 0 1
Table 3: Scores in (C,V1).
Table 3 shows the overall scores of all candidates in subelection (C,V1). Since the strict majority
threshold is n+m+ 1 in subelection (C,V1), only candidate x has a strict majority. Thus x is the
unique FV winner of subelection (C,V1) and is proceeding forward to the final round.
w x y b j fk zi
score(C,V2) 2n 0 n−m 2n−1 1 2n−1
Table 4: Scores in (C,V2).
Table 4 shows the overall scores of all candidates in subelection (C,V2). In this subelection,
the strict majority threshold is 2n + 1. As one can see in Table 4, there is no candidate with a
strict majority on any level in election (C,V2). Among all candidates, w has the highest score in
subelection (C,V2) and thus moves forward to the final round.
Since in the final round none of the two candidates, x and w, has a strict majority on any level,
and since score({w,x},V )(w) = 2n > n+m+1 = score({w,x},V )(x) because n > m+1, candidate w is
the unique FV winner in the election resulting from this partition of voters.
From right to left: Suppose that w can be made a unique FV winner by exerting control by
partition of voters in model TP. Let V = (V1,V2) be some such successful partition. In order to
prove that S has an exact cover for B, we will show the following three statements:
1. The final round of the election corresponding to partition V = (V1,V2) consists of the candi-
dates x and w.
2. S has a cover for B.
3. This cover is an exact cover.
As to (1), among all candidates, only candidate x and the candidates in F have a score less than
score(C,V )(w) (see Table 2). Thus, these are the only possible candidates who could face w in the
final round.6 Now, a candidate fk can get into the final round only if in fk’s first-round subelection
6Note that in election (C,V ), no candidate has a strict majority. This remains true, if we remove candidates from C.
Thus, the winner of the final round is a winner by score and not by majority on any level.
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there are only voters from the sixth group and at most one voter from the fifth group.7 So, if a
candidate fk could make it to the final round then w has to be the unique FV winner of the other
first-round subelection. However, this is not possible, since both y and w get 2n points in that
subelection, and y gains his or her points already on the first level. Thus, no candidate fk ∈ F can
participate in the final round. It follows that the only way to make w a unique FV winner via exerting
control by partition of voters in model TP is that w faces only candidate x in the final round.
As to (2), let x be the unique FV winner of subelection (C,V1) and w the unique FV winner of
subelection (C,V2). Since in each vote in the third and fourth voter group, each candidate b j ∈ B
appears on an earlier level than w, there has to be a cover in S for B, for otherwise there would be
at least one b j ∈ B who ties w in (C,V2) by score, and reaches that score on an earlier level than w.
Let the size of the cover be m′. Note that m′ ≥ m.
As to (3), note that each voter of the second group has to be in (C,V1), for otherwise there would
be at least one zi ∈ Z who ties w in (C,V2) by score, and reaches that score on an earlier level than w.
The following must hold:
score(C,V1)(x)− score(C,V1)(y) = (n+m+1)− (n+m
′) = m+1−m′ > 0.
This is possible only if m′= m. Hence, S has an exact cover for B, which completes the proof. ❑
The following construction will be used to handle the destructive case of control by partition of
voters in model TP.
Construction 3.15. Let (B,S ,k) be a given instance of Hitting Set, where B = {b1,b2, . . . ,bm} is a
set, S = {S1,S2, . . . ,Sn} is a collection of nonempty subsets Si ⊆ B, and k < m is a positive integer.8
Define the election (C,V ), where C = B ∪ D ∪ E ∪ {c,w} is the candidate set with D =
{d1, . . . ,d2(m+1)} and E = {e1, . . . ,e2(m−1)} and where V consists of the following 2n(k+1)+4m+
2mk voters:
1. For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, there are k+1 voters of the form:
w Si c | D∪E ∪ (B−Si).
2. For each j, 1 ≤ j ≤ m, there is one voter of the form:
c b j w | (B−{b j})∪D∪E.
3. For each j, 1 ≤ j ≤ m, there are (k−1) voters of the form:
b j | (B−{b j})∪D∪E∪{c,w}.
7Otherwise, since score(C,V)( fk) = 1, it might happen that y or a candidate zi ∈ Z would also be a winner in this
subelection and would move forward to the final round.
8Note that the assumption k < m can be made without loss of generality, since the problem Hitting Set becomes trivial
if k = m.
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c w b j dp er
score1 n(k+ 1)+ 2m+mk n(k+ 1)+ 1 k− 1 ≤ 1 1
score2 n(k+ 1)+ 2m+mk+ 1 n(k+ 1)+mk+ k ≤ k+ n(k+ 1) 1 1
score3 ≥ n(k+ 1)+ 2m+mk+ 1 n(k+ 1)+mk+ k+ 2m+1 ≤ k+ n(k+ 1) 1 1
Table 5: Scores in (C,V ).
4. For each p, 1 ≤ p ≤ m+1, there is one voter of the form:
d2(p−1)+1 d2p w | B∪ (D−{d2(p−1)+1,d2p})∪E ∪{c}.
5. For each r, 1 ≤ r ≤ 2(m−1), there is one voter of the form:
er | B∪D∪ (E−{er}∪{c,w}.
6. There are n(k+1)+m− k+1 voters of the form:
c | B∪D∪E∪{w}.
7. There are mk+ k−1 voters of the form:
c w | B∪D∪E.
8. There is one voter of the form:
w c | B∪D∪E.
The strict majority threshold for V is maj(V ) = n(k+1)+2m+mk+1. In election (C,V ), only
the two candidates c and w reach a strict majority, w on the third level and c on the second level (see
Table 5). Thus c is the unique level 2 FV winner of election (C,V ).
The proof of Theorem 3.17 will make use of the following claim.
Claim 3.16. In election (C,V ) from Construction 3.15, for every partition of V into V1 and V2,
candidate c is an FV winner of either (C,V1) or (C,V2).
Proof. For a contradiction, suppose that in both subelections, (C,V1) and (C,V2), candidate c is
not an FV winner. In particular, c can have no strict majority in either of (C,V1) and (C,V2). Since
score1(C,V )(c) =
‖V‖/2, the two subelections must satisfy the following conditions:
1. Both ‖V1‖ and ‖V2‖ are even numbers and
2. score1(C,V1)(c) = ‖V1‖/2 and score
1
(C,V2)(c) =
‖V2‖/2.
Otherwise, c would have a strict majority already on the first level in one of the subelections.
Since in both subelections c has only one point less than the strict majority threshold already on the
first level, and since c will get a strict majority no later than on the second level, in both subelections
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there must be candidates whose level 2 scores are higher than the level 2 score of candidate c. Table 5
shows the level 2 scores of all candidates. Only candidates w and a b j ∈ B have a chance to tie or
beat candidate c on that level.
Essentially, there are two possibilities for winning the two subelections. First, it is possible that
both subelections are won by two distinct candidates from B (say, bx is a winner of (C,V1) and by is
a winner of (C,V2)). Thus the following must hold:
score2(C,V1)(bx)+ score
2
(C,V2)(by) ≥ score
2
(C,V )(c)
2n(k+1)+2k−n(k+1) ≥ n(k+1)+mk+2m+1
2k ≥ mk+2m+1
0 ≥ (m−2)k+2m+1.
This is a contradiction to the basic assumption that both k > 0 and m > 0. Thus only the second
possibility for c to lose both subelections remains, namely that one subelection, say (C,V1), is won
by a candidate from B, say bx, and the other subelection, (C,V2), is won by candidate w. Then it
must hold that:
score2(C,V1)(bx)+ score
2
(C,V2)(w) ≥ score
2
(C,V )(c)
n(k+1)+ k−n(k+1)+n(k+1)+mk+ k ≥ n(k+1)+mk+2m+1
2k ≥ 2m+1.
This is a contradiction to the assumption that k < m, so c must be an FV winner in one of the
subelections. ❑
Theorem 3.17. Fallback voting is resistant to destructive control by partition of voters in model TP.
Proof. Susceptibility holds by Lemma 3.4. To prove NP-hardness, we reduce Hitting Set to our
control problem. Consider the election (C,V ) constructed according to Construction 3.15 from a
given Hitting Set instance (B,S ,k), where B= {b1, . . . ,bm} is a set, S = {S1, . . . ,Sn} is a collection
of nonempty subsets Si ⊆ B, and k < m is a positive integer.
We claim that S has a hitting set B′ ⊆ B of size k if and only if c can be prevented from winning
by partition of voters in model TP.
From left to right: Suppose, B′ ⊆ B is a hitting set of size k for S . Partition V into V1 and V2
the following way. Let V1 consist of those voters of the second group where b j ∈ B′ and of those
voters of the third group where b j ∈ B′. Let V2 = V −V1. In (C,V1), no candidate reaches a strict
majority (where maj(V1) = ‖B′‖+1 = k+1), and candidates c, w, and b j ∈ B′ win the election with
an approval score of k (see Table 6).
The scores in election (C,V2) are shown in Table 7.
Since in election (C,V2) no candidate from B wins, the candidates participating in the final
round are B′∪{c,w}. The scores in the final election (B′∪{c,w},V ) can be seen in Table 8. Since
candidates c and w are both level 2 FV winners, candidate c is no longer the unique FV winner of
the election.
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c w b j ∈ B′ b j 6∈ B′
score1 k 0 k−1 0
score2 k 0 k 0
score3 k k k 0
Table 6: Scores in (C,V1).
c w b j 6∈ B′ b j ∈ B′
score1 n(k+ 1)+ 2m− k+mk n(k+ 1)+ 1 k− 1 0
score2 n(k+ 1)+ 2m− k+mk+1 n(k+ 1)+mk+ k ≤ k+ n(k+ 1) ≤ n(k+ 1)
score3 ≥ n(k+ 1)+ 2m− k+mk+1 n(k+ 1)+mk+ 2m+ 1 ≤ k+ n(k+ 1) ≤ n(k+ 1)
Table 7: Scores in (C,V2).
c w b j ∈ B′
score1 n(k+ 1)+ 2m+mk n(k+ 1)+m+ 2 k− 1
score2 n(k+ 1)+ 2m+mk+ 1 n(k+ 1)+ 2m+mk+1 ≤ k+ n(k+ 1)
Table 8: Scores in (B′∪{c,w},V ).
From right to left: Suppose candidate c can be prevented from winnning by partition of voters
in model TP. From Claim 3.16 it follows that candidate c participates in the final round. For a con-
tradiction, suppose that S has not a hitting set of size k. Since c has a strict majority of approvals,
c has to be tied with or lose against another candidate by a strict majority at some level. Only can-
didate w has a strict majority of approvals, so w has to tie or beat c at some level in the final round.
Because of the scores of the candidates from D and E we may assume that only candidates from B
are participating in the final round besides c and w. Let B′ ⊆ B be the set of candidates who also
participate in the final round and let ℓ be the number of sets in S not hit by B′. Note that w cannot
reach a strict majority of approvals on the first level, so we consider the level 2 scores of c and w:
score2(B′∪{c,w},V )(c) = n(k+1)+2m+mk+1+ ℓ(k+1) and
score2(B′∪{c,w},V )(w) = n(k+1)+2m+mk+ k−‖B
′‖+1.
Since c has a strict majority already on the second level, w must tie or beat c on this level, so the
following must hold:
score2(B′∪{c,w},V )(c)− score
2
(B′∪{c,w},V )(w) ≤ 0
n(k+1)+2m+mk+1+ ℓ(k+1)−n(k+1)−2m−mk− k+‖B′‖−1 ≤ 0
‖B′‖− k+ ℓ(k+1) ≤ 0.
This is possible only if ℓ= 0, which contradicts to our assumption that there are sets in S that
are not hit by B′. From ℓ= 0 it follows that ‖B′‖ ≤ k, so S has a hitting set of size at most k. ❑
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4 Conclusions and Open Questions
We have shown that Brams and Sanver’s fallback voting system [BS09] is, like plurality voting and
SP-AV, fully resistant to candidate control. Also, like Copeland voting [FHHR09a] and SP-AV,
fallback voting is fully resistant to constructive control. Regarding voter control, all eight cases in
FV are susceptible, and we have shown resistance to constructive control by adding, by deleting,
and by partition of voters in models TE and TP, and by destructive control to partition of voters
in model TP. We have also shown vulnerability to destructive control by adding and by deleting
voters. Only one case remains open: destructive control by partition of voters in model TE. It would
be interesting to know whether FV is resistant or vulnerable to this control type.
Plurality voting is one of the other two systems for which full resistance to candidate control
is known [HHR07], but it has fewer resistances to voter control than fallback voting. SP-AV (the
other system with known full resistance to candidate control) does have the same number of proven
resistances [ENR09] to voter control as fallback voting. However, as has been argued in the intro-
duction, it is less natural a system than fallback voting. Also, it is still possible that fallback voting
might turn out to have even one more resistance to control than SP-AV in total.
Of course, resistance to control is not the only—and probably not even the most important—
criterion to guide one’s choice of voting system. Many other properties of voting systems (especially
their social choice weaknesses and strengths) are important as well and perhaps even more impor-
tant. For example, representing votes in plurality is a slightly simpler task than in fallback voting
or SP-AV: Plurality voters simply give a ranking of the candidates and the candidates with the most
top positions win, whereas fallback and SP-AV voters provide both their approvals/disapprovals of
the candidates and a ranking of the candidates (of all candidates in SP-AV and of only the approved
candidates in fallback voting). Also, winner determination in fallback voting and in SP-AV is a
slightly more complicated task than in plurality voting—though still easy. Regarding the social
choice benefits of FV, we mention that it satisfies, e.g., monotonicity and refer to [BS09] for a more
detailed discussion and further interesting results.
Supposing one does care about control resistance, when choosing a voting system one’s choice
will most likely (along with the system’s social choice properties, of course) depend on the types
of control one cares most about in the intended application. Also, when comparing voting systems,
one should weigh the nine immunities, four resistances, and nine vulnerabilities to control approval
voting is known to possess [HHR07] against FV’s at least 19 (and possibly even 20) resistances and
at least two (and at most three) vulnerabilities to control.
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A Some Results of [HHR07] Used in Section 3.2
Theorem A.1 ([HHR07]). 1. If a voiced voting system is susceptible to destructive control by
partition of voters (in model TE or TP), then it is susceptible to destructive control by deleting
voters.
2. Each voiced voting system is susceptible to constructive control by deleting candidates.
3. Each voiced voting system is susceptible to destructive control by adding candidates.9
Theorem A.2 ([HHR07]). 1. A voting system is susceptible to constructive control by adding
candidates if and only if it is susceptible to destructive control by deleting candidates.
2. A voting system is susceptible to constructive control by deleting candidates if and only if it
is susceptible to destructive control by adding candidates.
9Following Bartholdi et al. [BTT92], Hemaspaandra et al. [HHR07] considered only the case of control by adding a
limited number of candidates—the “unlimited” case was introduced only in (the conference precursors of) [FHHR09a].
However, it is easy to see that all results about control by adding candidates stated in Theorems A.1, A.2, and A.3 hold
true in both the limited and the unlimited case.
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3. A voting system is susceptible to constructive control by adding voters if and only if it is
susceptible to destructive control by deleting voters.
4. A voting system is susceptible to constructive control by deleting voters if and only if it is
susceptible to destructive control by adding voters.
Theorem A.3 ([HHR07]). 1. If a voting system is susceptible to constructive control by parti-
tion of voters (in model TE or TP), then it is susceptible to constructive control by deleting
candidates.
2. If a voting system is susceptible to constructive control by partition or run-off partition of
candidates (in model TE or TP), then it is susceptible to constructive control by deleting
candidates.
3. If a voting system is susceptible to constructive control by partition of voters in model TE,
then it is susceptible to constructive control by deleting voters.
4. If a voting system is susceptible to destructive control by partition or run-off partition of
candidates (in model TE or TP), then it is susceptible to destructive control by deleting can-
didates.
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